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Abstract: This paper uses data from SHARE 2004 to analyze one possible causal pathway of 
the health-wealth gradient, namely differences in the marginal propensity to save and spend 
across different health states. Conditional on age and current wealth, I find weak 
relationships between health and the intended use of a hypothetical windfall gift as well 
bequest expectations. The overall effect of health on wealth through this link is positive but 
very small. 
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1. Introduction 
A strong relationship between socio-economic status and health has been documented 
in numerous studies: Better educated individuals are healthier than less educated, individuals 
with high income are healthier than those with low income, employees at the top end of the 
occupational hierarchy are healthier than those working at the bottom end of the hierarchy, 
and wealthy individuals are healthier than poor individuals. The relationship is so ubiquitous 
that is often simply referred to as "the" gradient (Deaton, 2003). While the existence of the 
health-wealth gradient is universally acknowledged, its underlying causal mechanisms are still 
not well understood. The epidemiological literature tends to view socio-economic status as the 
antecedent, while economists study the direction of causation in both ways: how bad health 
affects the accumulation of wealth, and how being wealthy increases the likelihood of being 
healthy (see Smith, 1999, for an overview). 
Bad health affects income and wealth because it limits the ability to work, earn income 
and hence the ability to save out of earned income. Individuals in bad health are likely to 
retire earlier – e.g. on disability pensions – and they have less time to accumulate wealth than 
others. Given the same income, people in bad health might be able to save less because they 
are more likely to cover out-of-pocket expenses for their health. They might also want to save 
less for old-age because they have a lower life expectancy. But bad health can also increase 
the propensity to save, for example if a health shock increases the likelihood of future out-of-
pocket health expenses, or if a health shock increases the uncertainty about future income 
flows (precautionary savings motive). Some households might also decrease current or 
planned future transfers to children or other beneficiaries. Further, health is likely to affect the 
marginal utility of non-medical consumption, although it is not clear in which direction. 
Casual observation of spending patterns of sick or disabled persons suggests that negative 
health shocks decrease the marginal utility of consumption. This view is supported by 
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experimental evidence (Viscusi and Evans, 1990). However, Lillard and Weiss (1997), using 
U.S. PSID data, analyze the effect of health on saving and consumption decisions of retirees 
and find substantial reductions in accumulated wealth among individuals in poor health, 
implying that their marginal utility of consumption is higher. 
The aim of the present paper is to study the relationship between health and the 
propensity to save and spend using data from the 2004 Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe. Since the data are currently cross-sectional (they are in fact the first 
wave of a panel survey), it is not possible to look at actual saving behavior, for instance 
measured as wealth changes between waves. Instead, I look at hypothetical saving spending 
patterns, specifically the respondents' answers to the question how they would use a large 
windfall gift of €12,000: save, spend, or give or donate. In addition, I look at the effect of 
health on bequest expectations – conditional on current wealth. This gives an idea about how 
health affects future saving and expenditure plans. The analysis presented below is primarily 
descriptive, but it provides some interesting results. Very little is yet known about how health 
affects saving and spending patterns at older ages in European countries. 
 
2. Data description and measurements 
The data are drawn from Release 1 of the 2004 Survey of Health, Aging and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is financed by the European Commission and the 
National Institute on Aging (NIA) – for detailed information see Börsch-Supan et al. (2005) 
and Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2005). SHARE is modeled closely after the US Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and it is the first European data set to combine extensive information 
on physical and mental health with information on the income and assets of the elderly 
population. The data contain information on some 23,000 respondents aged 50 and older from 
15,000 households in 10 European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
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France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Greece – further data are currently being 
collected in Belgium and Israel). Probability samples have been drawn in each participating 
country. Table 1 gives a broad description of the SHARE sample, by country and age group. 
 
<about here Table 1> 
 
Health. The data contain a large amount of information on the respondents' health. 
SHARE asks for self-reported general health, diagnosed chronic conditions, symptoms, 
functional limitations, difficulties with activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADLs). Additionally, SHARE contains health measurements such 
as hand grip strength (for all respondents) and walking speed (for respondents with self-
reported mobility limitations and all respondents aged 75 and over). I combine all available 
health information in a single 0-to-1 health index, where 0 represents the worst observed 
health state ("near death") and 1 represents "perfect" health (see Jürges, 2005). Health states 
between near death and perfect health are given an index value between 0 and 1. The 
computed health index will be used as a proxy for true health. The very basis of any health 
index is comprehensive objective information about health problems: self reported diagnosed 
chronic conditions, mental illnesses, symptoms (especially pain), or functional limitations. If 
available, one also uses medical records, and measurements and tests like blood samples, grip 
strength, balance, gait speed, etc. The absence of any conditions, symptoms, or limitations, 
implies perfect health, i.e. an index value of 1. The presence of a condition reduces the health 
index by some given amount or percentage, the so-called disability weight. The disability 
weight of each condition or symptom is assumed to be the same for each respondent. 
Disability weights are often derived by expert judgements or surveys specialized to 
elicit health preferences, using time trade-off or standard gambles (see Torrance, 1986, for an 
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overview). Here, we will compute disability weights from within the SHARE sample (Cutler 
and Richardson, 1997; Groot 2000) by estimating generalized ordered probit regressions of 
self-reported health on a large number of variables representing chronic conditions, 
symptoms, ADL problems, physical functioning, height, weight, and cognitive functioning. I 
also included measurements of hand grip strength and walking speed. The health index is 
computed as the linear prediction from this regression (the latent variable), normalized to 0 
for the worst observed health state and 1 for the best observed health state. This procedure 
implies disability weights for each condition or impairment that are equal to the respective 
(also normalized) regression parameters. Table 2, column (1) shows the average health index 
by country. In terms of this index, Switzerland is the healthiest country and Spain is the least 
healthy country. Switzerland and Spain are also the countries with the smallest and largest 
"pure" inequality in health (as measured by the interquartile range of the health index, see 
column (2)). 
 
<about here Table 2> 
 
Total household net worth. SHARE contains detailed information on financial and real 
household assets. Total household wealth is computed as the sum of all assets combined 
minus debt. As other surveys, the SHARE raw data contain missing information on wealth. 
While non-response on asset ownership is a minor problem, asset values are notorious for 
item non-response. Following HRS and ELSA, SHARE has used so-called unfolding brackets 
(with three randomly chosen entry points) to elicit information from respondents who are 
unwilling or unable to answer questions for the value of their assets (see Juster and Smith, 
1997, and Hurd, 1998, for methodological issues). Missing values are then imputed five times 
conditional on the bracket value using hotdeck imputation (for details see Christellis, Jappelli, 
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and Padula, 2005). To account for the uncertainty inherent in imputation, SHARE follows a 
multiple imputation strategy as suggested e.g. in Rubin and Schenker (1986), Rubin (1987), 
or Little (1988). 
Table 2, column (3) shows, by country, median wealth holdings in Euro and the 
health-wealth "gradient" (measured as the difference in the average health index of 
individuals with household income below and above the country-specific wealth median, see 
(column (4)). Median wealth is largest in Switzerland and smallest in Greece. The wealth-
health gradient, in turn, is steepest in Greece and flattest Switzerland. All gradients are 
statistically different from zero, i.e. inequalities in health favor those who are better off 
financially in all SHARE countries. 
 
The marginal propensity to save and spend. The marginal propensity to save and 
spend is measured by the respondents' answers to the following hypothetical question: 
Imagine you received an unexpected gift of 12,000 Euro. Please look at Card 38. What would 
you use this money for? Showcard 38 contains 5 different items: 
1. Saving or investment 
2. Pay off debt 
3. Give to relatives or donations 
4. Buy durable item (house, car, furniture, large electrical appliances,...) 
5. Make a holiday trip or journey 
 
The respondent was then asked for each of item separately if he would use any money 
for it. If he said yes, he was asked how much he would use. The sequence continued as long 
as there was money left to spend. If the respondent had not spent the full €12,000 at the end of 
the sequence, the remainder was coded as "6. Other purposes". For the rest of the paper, the 
six categories are collapsed into three: 1. Saving and repaying debt, 2. Giving to relatives or 
donating, and 3. Spending (on durables and travel plus any residual amount). 
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<Table 3 about here> 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the expenditure plan data. The most important 
category is saving and investing. 59.5% of all respondents say they would save at least some 
part of the hypothetical gift (or repay debt). The average amount saved, conditional on saving, 
is €8,074 and the unconditional average is €4,807 or 40.1% of the total amount. Spending the 
money and giving it away to relatives are about equally important: 51.7% of the sample say 
they would give part of the money to relatives or donate it, and 50.6% of the total sample say 
they would spend at least part of the money. The average amount, conditional and total is 
somewhat larger for spending than for giving. 
 
Bequest expectations. Bequest expectations are asked in a two-stage sequence. The 
first question asks for the subjective probability of leaving a bequest in excess of €50,000. If 
the subjective probability is zero, then respondents are asked the chances of leaving any 
bequest at all. If the subjective probability in the first stage is larger than zero, respondents are 
asked the chances of leaving €150,000 or more. Table 4 shows the average chance of leaving 
a bequest in excess of €50,000 and €150,000, respectively, by levels of household wealth. The 
average subjective probability of leaving more than €50,000 is 49.6%, and the average 
subjective probability of leaving more than €150,000 is 27.5%. Obviously, these numbers 
depend very much on current wealth levels. For instance, among those with current net worth 
below €50,000, the chances of leaving at least €50,000 are 18.4%, in contrast to 56.4% among 
respondents with net worth between €50,000 and €150,000 and 74.2% among those with 
current net worth larger than €150,000. 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
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3. Results 
We now address the question how hypothetical or expected expenditure and savings 
patterns relate to the respondents' health. Are healthy respondents more or less likely to save? 
Do they report to save larger amounts than less healthy respondents? Are they more or less 
likely to expect to leave a bequest? If, for instance, individuals in bad health have a higher 
marginal utility of consumption (Lillard and Weiss, 1997), then they should be less willing to 
save from the hypothetical gift of €12,000 and they should want to save less of it. Skeptics 
might be inclined to criticize hypothetical expenditures data as a limited measure of what the 
respondents would actually do. However, the data are "well behaved" in many respects, i.e. 
they show expected relationship to key variables, such as age, family composition, and 
financial well-being. It is difficult to see why the relationship between the hypothetical 
expenditure plans and health should be less meaningful. 
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
The top panel of Table 5 contains the unconditional effect of health on the choices to 
save, give, or spend the hypothetical €12,000 windfall gift. The first column within each 
category contains the probability to use any amount larger than zero for the respective 
purpose, the second column contains the probability to use the entire sum of €12,000 for the 
respective purpose, and the third column shows the average amount (in Euro). To account for 
possible non-linearity, I have categorized the continuous health index into quartiles. 
The unconditional health effects on expenditure patterns are quite strong. Respondents 
in the top health quartile say they would save €5,136 on average, nearly €600 more than those 
in the bottom quartile. Half of this difference can be found between the first and second health 
quartile. Respondents in the top health category also say they would spend €4,213 on average, 
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an increase of more than €1,000 compared to respondents in the bottom health category. In 
contrast, the amount respondents say they would give to relatives and charities decreases by 
nearly €2,000 if one moves from the first to the fourth health quartile. Here the proportion of 
those who say they would give away the entire sum shows a particularly strong decline from 
21.1% to 8.6%. Overall, the unconditional results suggest that better health increases the 
propensity to save from (unexpected) income gains and thus possibly explains larger 
household net worth. However, the increase in savings is not matched by a lower propensity 
to spend but rather comes at the expense of private transfers. 
Let us now examine how much of the unconditional health effect can be accounted for 
by other variables, most importantly age and financial status. The bottom panel of Table 5 
contains conditional expenditure patterns. These numbers are derived as predicted values 
from probit regressions of the probability to save at all and save the entire amount, 
respectively, and from a linear regression of the amount, evaluated at the sample means of all 
covariates other than health. The full regression results are shown in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
Accounting for the effects of age, age squared, sex, the presence of children and 
grandchildren, self-reported financial situation, and current household wealth leads to a 
dramatic reduction in the estimated health effects on expenditure patterns. The effect of health 
on savings intentions is now virtually nonexistent. If at all, one finds a small decrease in the 
propensity to save at all and in the average savings amount. A look at the detailed results in 
Table A1 identifies two main reasons: one is the effect of age. Savings intentions decline 
strongly with age, which is in line with the predictions of the life-cycle model. Since older 
respondents are also less healthy, the unconditional effect of health on savings plans is for the 
most part an age effect. The second reason is financial well-being. The more difficult the 
  
10 
financial situation of the household, the higher the propensity to save some or all of the 
unexpected gift. This is consistent with a precautionary or a buffer stock savings motive. 
Conditional on covariates, better health reduces the likelihood of giving at all, giving 
the entire sum and the average amount given to relatives or charities. Note that this reduction 
basically takes place when moving from the first to the second health quartile, i.e. those in the 
bottom health quartile have a higher propensity to give than the rest. In terms of size, the 
conditional effect of health is much smaller than the unconditional effect, for instance 3.0 
compared to 12.5 percentage points for the propensity to transfer the full amount, and less 
than €400 compared to €1,750 for the average amount. Still, these differences are statistically 
different from zero. 
The decrease in transfers to relatives and charities is matched by a statistically 
significant increase in the probability to say that one would spend some of the unexpected 
gift. Again the effect can only be found between the first two health quartiles, meaning that 
only the least healthy respondents have a systematically different spending pattern than the 
rest. The effect is again small in size. The likelihood of saying one would spend at least some 
amount increases by less than 7 percentage points and the average amount one would spend 
increases only by about €400. 
One possible interpretation of these results is that individuals – if in bad health – have 
indeed a slightly lower marginal utility from consumption. Deteriorating health shifts the 
reported expenditure plans somewhat away from (some) spending and towards giving 
(everything) to relatives or charities, while savings remain largely unaffected. Overall, the 
size of the health effect is rather small. 
Compared to the overall effect of health on the propensity to save or spend a windfall 
gift of €12,000, the effect of some of the control variables is quite sizeable. For instance, at 
the sample mean of all other variables, a respondent aged 50 has an average probability of 
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76% of saying he would save some amount, whereas a respondent aged 80 has a 43% 
probability to do so. At the same time, the propensity to give increases from 39% to 66%. 
Women have a 4 percentage point higher probability to say they would save, a 5 percentage 
point lower probability to say they would spend some amount, and a 15 percentage point 
higher probability to say they would give to relatives or charities. Finally, the probability to 
save any of windfall gift is 18 percentage points higher if respondents live in a household that 
has "great difficulty" to make ends meet rather than in a household that gets along "easily". 
They also have a 14 percentage point lower propensity to transfer money to relatives or 
charities. 
<Table 6 about here> 
Let us now turn to bequest expectations. Conditional on current wealth levels and 
future income streams, the relationship between health and bequest expectations tells us 
whether respondents in bad health are more or less likely to run down assets in the future. 
Table 6 shows the average self-reported probability of leaving a bequest worth more than 
€50,000 and €150,000, respectively. The unconditional average bequest expectations are 
clearly increasing in health. For instance, respondents in the bottom health quartile say on 
average that there is a 23.8% chance of leaving a bequest worth more than €150,000, 
compared to 40.9% in the top health quartile. Conditional on a large set of control variables, 
including household net worth and a home ownership dummy (to indicate illiquidity of 
assets), the effect of health remains positive but becomes considerably weaker (detailed 
regression results are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix). The average chance of leaving a 
bequest larger than €150,000 rises by only 3% if one moves up from the bottom to the top 
quartile of the health distribution. As in the case of expenditure plans, the effect is strongest 
(and statistically significant) at the lower tail of the health distribution. One interpretation of 
this result is that respondents in bad health have somewhat higher expectations to run down 
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assets in the future. However, the effect appears to be too small to account for the health-
wealth gradient shown in the preceding section. 
 
4. Summary and Discussion 
This article examines one potential causal pathway between individual health and 
wealth, namely the idea that health changes saving and spending patterns. The positive 
correlation between health and wealth could in part be explained if there was a lower 
propensity to save among less healthy individuals. First, I describe the relationship between 
health and the propensity of respondents to save and spend from an unexpected (windfall) gift 
of €12,000. This analysis is based on answers to a hypothetical question. The results suggest 
that health significantly increases the propensity to transfer money to relatives or charities, 
significantly reduces the propensity to use the gift for consumption purposes, but does not 
change savings behavior at all. Moreover, even the significant effects found in the data – after 
controlling for age, financial status and current wealth levels – are rather weak. They also do 
not go in a direction that would generate a positive correlation between health and wealth. 
The assumption that bad health decreases wealth via effects on savings and expenditure 
patterns is thus not supported by the data. Somewhat contradictory evidence comes from the 
analysis of bequest expectations. Conditional on current wealth, healthy respondents expect to 
leave larger bequests, which suggests that they might expect to spend less/save more. 
However, the size of the measured effect is again fairly small, potentially accounting for a 
small proportion of the health-wealth correlation only. 
The analysis presented here is based on the first wave of a longitudinal survey, which 
limits the analysis in two important ways. First, one is not yet able to observe changes in 
health but only different health states. Observing how the behavior of individuals changes in 
reaction to health shocks is likely to increase our knowledge about the causal effects of health 
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on expenditure patterns and bequest expectations. Second, the analysis is based on individuals 
statements about how they would distribute a hypothetical windfall gift among different 
purposes. When a longitudinal dimension is added to the data it will become possible to study 
how factual savings, for instance measured as wealth changes between waves, change in 
response to health shocks. 
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Table 1: Sample size, by country and age group 
Country Age 50-64 Age 65-79 Age 80+ 
Austria 1,015 739 172 
Germany 1,610 1,135 189 
Sweden 1,610 1,088 298 
Netherlands 1,706 927 217 
Spain 1,098 978 291 
Italy 1,366 957 169 
France 932 624 179 
Denmark 924 522 173 
Greece 1,038 719 204 
Switzerland 512 333 100 
Note – SHARE 2004 release 1 (unweighted) 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for health and wealth in SHARE 2004, by country 
 
 
Country 
(1) 
Average health 
index 
(2) 
Health IQR 
(3) 
Median 
household net worth 
(in €) 
(4) 
Wealth-Health-
Gradient* 
Austria 0.814 0.160 103,634 0.042 
Germany 0.808 0.169 118,800 0.047 
Sweden 0.813 0.157 112,796 0.052 
Netherlands 0.826 0.144 154,425 0.056 
Spain 0.761 0.220 138,606 0.036 
Italy 0.785 0.186 151,660 0.049 
France 0.798 0.161 161,395 0.057 
Denmark 0.810 0.161 120,040 0.059 
Greece 0.811 0.172 95,714 0.070 
Switzerland 0.858 0.115 241,755 0.026 
Note – SHARE 2004 release 1 (unweighted); *Difference in average health of individuals with household net 
worth above and below the median. 
 
Table 3: Summary of hypothetical spending data 
 Percent Average 
conditional 
amount 
Average 
total 
amount 
Percent of total 
gift 
Save 59.5 8,084.2 4,807.4 40.1 
Give 51.7 6,496.8 3,361.1 28.0 
Spend 50.6 6,871.6 3,831.6 31.9 
 
Table 4: Average bequest expectations, by wealth quintile 
 Inheritance > €50k Inheritance > €150k 
HH Net Worth < €50k 18.4 6.3 
HH Net Worth €50k-€150k 56.4 19.2 
HH Net Worth > €150k 74.2 57.1 
   
Total 49.6 27.5 
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Table 5: Saving, giving, and spending, by health index 
 Save Give Spend 
 Any All Amount Any All Amount Any All Amount 
Unconditional 
Health Index – Q1 0.550 0.206 4,440 0.591 0.211 4,401 0.460 0.118 3,159 
Health Index – Q2 0.596 0.201 4,745 0.533 0.132 3,396 0.564 0.143 3,859 
Health Index – Q3 0.609 0.215 4,935 0.488 0.106 2,980 0.591 0.149 4,085 
Health Index – Q4 0.629 0.223 5,136 0.461 0.086 2,651 0.606 0.153 4,213 
Conditional (at sample means of control variables)* 
Health Index – Q1 0.602 0.212 4,856 0.538 0.127 3,652 0.507 0.123 3,492 
Health Index – Q2 0.612 0.197 4,843 0.519 0.096 3,250 0.572 0.137 3,907 
Health Index – Q3 0.603 0.204 4,822 0.509 0.095 3,243 0.575 0.133 3,935 
Health Index – Q4 0.591 0.200 4,734 0.512 0.097 3,286 0.575 0.136 3,980 
Notes – higher quartiles mean better health; * Control variables: age, age squared, sex, children dummy, 
grandchildren dummy, education, self-reported financial situation, wealth quartile. 
 
Table 6: Bequest expectations, by health index 
 Unconditional Conditional* 
 > €50k > €150k > €50k > €150k 
Health Index – Q1 43.3 23.8 51.4 31.8 
Health Index – Q2 55.4 33.5 54.5 33.4 
Health Index – Q3 59.6 38.0 55.5 34.0 
Health Index – Q4 60.9 40.9 55.1 34.8 
Notes – higher quartiles mean better health; * Control variables: age, age squared, sex, marital status, children 
dummy, grandchildren dummy, education, self-reported financial situation, home ownership, household net 
worth. 
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Table A1: Probit and OLS-Models of Saving, Spending, and Giving Intentions 
 Save Give Spend 
 Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Amount Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Amount Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Amount 
Health Index – Q2 0.038 -0.012 0.090 -0.023 -0.087** -0.230** 0.081** -0.022 0.140 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.095) (0.027) (0.032) (0.081) (0.026) (0.033) (0.088) 
Health Index – Q3 0.037 0.007 0.108 -0.038 -0.164** -0.311** 0.114** -0.020 0.203* 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.097) (0.027) (0.035) (0.083) (0.027) (0.033) (0.090) 
Health Index – Q4 0.013 -0.035 -0.029 -0.039 -0.128** -0.274** 0.135** 0.002 0.303** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.104) (0.029) (0.038) (0.089) (0.029) (0.035) (0.096) 
Age -0.054** -0.052** -0.242** 0.017 0.026 -0.069 0.093** 0.083** 0.310** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.042) (0.012) (0.015) (0.036) (0.012) (0.015) (0.039) 
Agesq / 100 0.019* 0.032** 0.116** 0.005 0.010 0.139** -0.081** -0.064** -0.255** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.031) (0.009) (0.011) (0.027) (0.009) (0.011) (0.029) 
Female -0.117** -0.300** -0.839** 0.382** 0.160** 0.895** 0.088** -0.128** -0.055 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.067) (0.019) (0.025) (0.057) (0.018) (0.023) (0.062) 
Children -0.089** -0.058 -0.349** 0.447** 0.401** 1.275** -0.199** -0.256** -0.926** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.118) (0.034) (0.053) (0.101) (0.033) (0.037) (0.109) 
Grandchildren -0.055* -0.113** -0.352** 0.220** 0.199** 0.844** -0.101** -0.186** -0.492** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.086) (0.024) (0.034) (0.074) (0.024) (0.029) (0.079) 
Low educationa) 0.007 0.088** 0.142 0.022 0.070* 0.166* -0.122** -0.050 -0.308** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.085) (0.024) (0.032) (0.073) (0.024) (0.029) (0.079) 
High education -0.059* 0.052 -0.117 0.040 0.076* 0.117 -0.045 0.018 0.000 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.099) (0.027) (0.039) (0.085) (0.027) (0.033) (0.091) 
Make ends meet:  0.475** 0.205** 1.455** -0.314** -0.513** -1.367** 0.084* -0.111* -0.088 
 great difficultyb) (0.037) (0.040) (0.132) (0.037) (0.049) (0.113) (0.036) (0.046) (0.122) 
Make ends meet 0.328** 0.096** 0.951** -0.192** -0.366** -0.949** 0.091** -0.078* -0.002 
 some difficulty (0.027) (0.030) (0.098) (0.027) (0.036) (0.084) (0.027) (0.034) (0.091) 
Make ends meet 0.200** 0.008 0.489** -0.115** -0.268** -0.629** 0.126** -0.010 0.140 
 fairly easily (0.023) (0.027) (0.084) (0.024) (0.031) (0.072) (0.023) (0.028) (0.078) 
Household Net WorthQ2c) 0.088** -0.009 0.194* -0.031 -0.133** -0.235** 0.068* -0.026 0.041 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.098) (0.028) (0.038) (0.082) (0.028) (0.036) (0.093) 
Household Net Worth Q3 0.047 0.069* 0.234* -0.028 -0.046 -0.119 -0.025 -0.034 -0.115 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.102) (0.029) (0.040) (0.097) (0.030) (0.035) (0.109) 
Household Net Worth Q4 -0.016 0.045 0.078 0.005 -0.057 -0.077 0.001 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.107) (0.027) (0.036) (0.086) (0.028) (0.041) (0.108) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.960** 1.809** 9.308** -1.814** -3.136** -3.872* -3.030** -3.483** 1.436 
 (0.411) (0.448) (1.447) (0.411) (0.543) (1.909) (0.411) (0.514) (1.746) 
N 20,202 20,202 7,603 20,202 20,202 10,325 20,202 20,202 11,209 
Note – Standard errors in parentheses; + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; a) Reference category: medium education; b) Reference category: very 
easily; c) Reference category: 1st wealth quartile. 
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Table A2: Linear regression of bequest expectations on health, controlling for covariates 
 Inheritance > €50k Inheritance > €150k 
Health Index – Q2 3.135** 1.508 
 (0.881) (0.874) 
Health Index – Q3 4.043** 2.200* 
 (0.920) (0.885) 
Health Index – Q4 3.666** 2.948** 
 (0.945) (0.959) 
Age 0.415 0.485 
 (0.378) (0.374) 
Age squared / 100 -0.258 -0.342 
 (0.278) (0.274) 
Sex -0.884 0.369 
 (0.616) (0.620) 
Married 0.227 0.413 
 (0.320) (0.313) 
Children 4.240** 5.332** 
 (1.068) (1.038) 
Grandchildren -1.189 -2.483** 
 (0.792) (0.769) 
Low educationa) -4.235** -5.037** 
 (0.793) (0.786) 
High education 1.711 3.050** 
 (0.901) (0.896) 
Make ends meet: great difficultyb) -13.932** -14.124** 
 (1.233) (1.210) 
Make ends meet: some difficulty -10.900** -11.904** 
 (0.920) (0.897) 
Make ends meet: fairly easily -6.729** -8.201** 
 (0.784) (0.767) 
Home owner 23.411** 14.478** 
 (1.080) (1.021) 
HH Net worth €50k-€150kc) 25.059** 3.598** 
 (1.171) (1.033) 
HH Net worth >€150k 36.634** 36.015** 
 (1.235) (1.123) 
   
Country dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 19,566 19,271 
Notes - a) Reference category: medium education; b) Reference category: very easily; c) Reference category: HH net worth < €50k 
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